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In a team project with signiﬁcant complementarities between various players' individual tasks, news of early
success by some encourages others to push ahead with their own tasks while lack of success has the opposite
effect. This ex-post disparity in incentives created gives rise to two differing implications, ex ante, for an ideal
team transparency. Sometimes it is better to commit to complete secrecy within the team of the various
participants' interim progress as it mitigates the negative effect of failures. In some other situations,
commitment to full disclosure is better as players are then encouraged to be proactive by exerting efforts in the
early rounds and motivate other team members into continued activities by way of interim progress.
Transparency (of outcomes) has thus double edges — it can boost incentives or dampen incentives.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In any organization transparency of activities, progress and
procedures (or the lack of it) shape important incentives for its key
members. A popular view is that an organization should be
transparent. Several contributions have already shown why taking
an unqualiﬁed stand on this subject could be wrong.1 In this paper, we
highlight a novel and confounding implication of transparency in a
team context involving players who engage in a multi-task project
with signiﬁcant complementarities.
We consider a two-agent joint (or team) project with observable
efforts. Each agent's effort inﬂuences the probability of success of the
speciﬁc task assigned to him. The overall project is successful only if both
tasks are successful. The agents are allowed two attempts to complete
their tasks. While a team member is able to observe his partner's ﬁrst
attempt, its outcome, i.e., whether it is successful or not, can be credibly
conveyed only by the organization (or the teammanager).2,3 This setup is
not unnatural and is becoming a more acceptable description of some
work environments: (i) mutual observability of efforts can be a
distinguishing property of certain types of team works, for instance in
softwaredevelopment sometimes importantmembersmaybe seated in a
‘war room’ or ‘dedicated project room’, known as team collocation, to
facilitate rapid progress of the tasks that are complementary in nature;4
and (ii) although the supervisor (or the project leader) may not always
observe efforts, hewill have the special expertise to determine the state of
progress of various tasks. We also consider a variant model where efforts
are not observable within the team.
An example is an R&D team project broken down into different
components, all of which must work for the composite to succeed.5
Researchers often make several attempts to crack a problem. Lack of
progress in the initial stagesmaybe suppressed tokeep teammoralehigh;
also, if one component meets early success, the news, while morale-
boosting, might be suppressed to prevent crucial methodological
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1 See Angeletos and Pavan (2004), Bac (2001), Fang and Moscarini (2005), Gavazza
and Lizzeri (2007, 2009), Levy (2007a,b), Mattozzi and Merlo (2007), and Prat (2005).
2 Given the obvious motive of encouraging partners into actions, any claim to success
by a team member is always going to be viewed with due skepticism.
3 In several works, Winter (2004, 2006, 2009, 2010) analyzes team settings with
complementarity between various members' tasks and each member having only one
opportunity to attempt his task. The main focus of his papers are on the design of effort-
inducing rewards/incentives under observable as well as unobservable efforts, with the
former giving rise to sequential efforts and the latter corresponding to simultaneous efforts;
the effort outcomes inhismodels arenot observable until at thevery end.On incentivedesign
with complementarities across tasks but in a principal–agent setting (rather than team
setting), see MacDonald and Marx (2001).
4 Teasley et al. (2002) study the positive impact of collocation on team productivity.
See also Eccles et al. (2010). The environment of observable efforts (i.e., collocation)
and its implications for team incentives is the main focus of peer transparency studied
in a ﬁeld experiment paper by Falk and Ichino (2006), two recent theoretical papers by
Winter (2006, 2010) as cited above, and the work of Mohnen et al. (2008).
5 Projects of this nature are quite common in the industries, especially in software
engineering or in the development of any new product or technology. Academic
researchers in some disciplines carry out collaborative projects with considerable
complementarities under the supervision of a project leader who oversees project
development and coordination.
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information from leaking out to competitors.6 The organization, however,
cannot make selective reports on progress, choosing only to announce
“goodnews”, otherwise teammembers candeduce the state of theproject
from the level of publicity, in the sense of Milgrom (1981). Suppose that
the organization aims tomaximize the probability of the project's success.
Should it always disclose its information about the project's up-to-date
progress?7
Clearly, an agent with a failed ﬁrst attempt will ﬁnd the information
about another agent's success/failure relevant. An early success by
another team member can conceivably embolden an agent to exert
effort in the second stage, while failure can discourage him. Thus,
committing to a policy of disclosure may have sharply divergent results
for the manager. Concealing the information, on the other hand, may
narrow this divergence. This occurs because, absent this information on
outcomes, an agent will be left to infer the occurrence of success or
failure, i.e., their likelihoods, fromhis partner's ﬁrst-period effort choice.
We are going to argue that a policy of disclosure may not always be
preferred. First, with disclosure we derive an equilibrium where both
agents exert effort in the ﬁrst round, and if one fails then he exerts
effort once more provided the other agent has been successful in the
ﬁrst round. Next, we analyze the situation where only ﬁrst-round
effort choices, but not the outcomes, are observable.We ﬁnd that if the
effort cost is non-negligible but moderately low, secrecy weakly
improves on disclosure by uniquely implementing in subgame perfect
equilibrium themaximal individual and collective efforts over the two
rounds (which is also an equilibrium under disclosure along with
another equilibrium involving lower efforts). However, for higher
costs disclosure may have a very different impact: rather than
chancing their luck with little efforts in the early rounds in the case
of secrecy, with disclosure the agents tend to be proactive by exerting
efforts in the early rounds so that any individual success prompts
others to continue with their efforts in the later stages. So there is a
double edge to transparency of outcomes — it can boost incentives or
dampen incentives.
The confounding implications of transparency in this paper further
demonstrate the complexity of the issue. On this subject, Prat (2005)
had ﬁrst pointed out the importance of distinguishing between
transparency of actions and transparency of the consequences of
actions. In a principal–agent model where the agent is motivated by
career concerns, the principal beneﬁts by committing to learn only
about the consequences of the agent's action and not the action itself.
With the agent's ability unknown to both the principal and the agent,
if the principal observes the agent's action then the agent may dis-
regard his own signal of a payoff relevant state (from the principal's
point of view) and choose an action that a high-ability type might be
expected to select (state and outcome, along with the agent's ability,
jointly determine the principal's payoff), thus hindering the principal
from discerning the agent's ability.
In a different principal–agent formulation where the principal is
informed about the agent's productivity, Fang and Moscarini (2005)
have argued that making worker's quality transparent through wage
differentiation could either beneﬁt or harm the ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally,
differentiated contracts convey “good news” to some workers about
their ability, which raises morale and effort, but “bad news” to others,
whichdepressesmorale andeffort; thenegative effect onoutputmaybe
large enough to justify offering the same contract to all employees. In
our analysis there is no ability parameter, only efforts matter and the
issue is about strategic disclosures of individual successes and failures.
Several other works noted in the introductory paragraph have
studied the negative effects of transparency in various applications and
especially in politics and bureaucracies. Levy (2007a,b) shows that in
committee decisions through voting, transparency of individual votes
leads to worse decisions when those casting votes are motivated by
career concerns. Mattozzi and Merlo (2007) study the relationship
between political transparency and the quality of politicians attracted
and show an inverse relationship, i.e., with more transparency quality
drops. Gavazza and Lizzeri (2007) have argued that when the service
qualities of different public ofﬁces are released, demands for better
quality providers increase which, in the absence of high-powered
incentives, leads to crowding and rationing, ultimately lowering the
incentives of high-quality provision. Gavazza and Lizzeri (2009) delve
into several subtle and complicated issues of transparency of the
political system, of government spending and revenues. The authors
argue that while transparency of government spending is beneﬁcial,
improved transparency of taxes (i.e., revenues), through better
intertemporal smoothing of the tax burden, can paradoxically lead to
more wasteful transfer spending by political parties. In a macroeco-
nomic application, Angeletos and Pavan (2004) analyze the welfare
effects of varying levels of transparency of some payoff relevant public
information in economies with strong complementarities between (a
continuum of) agents' investments and the possibility of multiple
investment equilibria; greater transparency improves coordination of
agent activities, but given that coordination can lead to a collectively
good or bad equilibrium, more transparency may be beneﬁcial or
harmful. Different from the above literature, Bac (2001) relates
transparency of decision making in public ofﬁces to opportunities of
establishing connections with key ofﬁcials that may ultimately result in
more corruption.
Finally, we would like to make a distinction between transparency
in teams as analyzed in this paper and the idea of interim review (or
feedback) inmultistage tournaments (recent contributions are Aoyagi
(2010), Gershkov and Perry (2009), and Goltsman and Mukherjee
(2011)) where interim performance evaluations are used as a
strategic device to incentivize competing players to exert greater
efforts over several rounds. In ours, the issue is not about using
interim outcomes directly as the basis for a winner-take-all reward,
rather the question is whether making ﬁrst-round outcomes public
would help or hinder teammembers' effort incentives and its effect on
the team's success which is a common goal for the teammembers. Our
work is thus closer to the team problems studied by Winter (2004,
2006, 2009, 2010).8
In the next section, we provide an outline of the model. In
Sections 3 and 4 we analyze the two cases, disclosure and secrecy. Our
main results comparing the two mechanisms appear in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix, except
for the proofs of Lemmas 4 and 5, which are available online.
2. The model
A joint project consists of two tasks, with two agents (henceforth
“players”) assigned one task each. The joint project succeeds if and
only if both tasks are completed successfully. A player is given a
maximum of two periods to successfully complete his task; effort is
discrete, costs c per unit, and is perfectly observable. Towards the end
of Section 4 we discuss the implications for our analysis if efforts are
not observable.
6 Even just the news of interim progress of one ﬁrm may prompt rival ﬁrms into
greater activities (as in Choi (1991) where a ﬁrm's success in the initial stages, by
conveying that the project is feasible, is “good news” to its rival) or discourage them
(as in the R&D race of Bag and Dasgupta (1995), where early success reveals a ﬁrm to
be a “high” type, thereby intimidating weaker ﬁrms). Thus there may be other reasons,
besides internal incentives, why an organization may prefer secrecy or not.
7 Sometimes the supervisor may choose to only occasionally announce the state of
progress for reasons other than strategic disclosures, time constraint being one of
them. This paper assumes away the time constraint and focuses only on strategic
disclosures.
8 In Bag and Pepito (2010), we consider issues of peer transparency in teams where
team members make repeated efforts towards a joint project. There, outcomes are not
observed until at the very end of the project's duration. It is shown that transparency
of efforts during the project's development is beneﬁcial when efforts are complemen-
tary in the project's success but neutral if the efforts are substitutes.
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A player's effort inﬂuences his task's success as follows. In Round 1,
a player decides whether to exert effort (one unit) or shirk (exert no
effort). Denote player i's effort in the ﬁrst round by ei1, and the
probability that his task succeeds given ei1 by p(ei1). Suppose that for
i=1,2,
p ei1ð Þ = α if ei1 = 0β if ei1 = 1

where 0 b α b β b 1.
Players choose their ﬁrst-round efforts simultaneously, following
which each player observes whether his own task has been successful
or not but does not observe the outcome of the other player's effort.
The principal observes both tasks' outcomes and can credibly and
publicly disclose his information to the players, if he wishes to do so,
before they choose their second-round efforts. Any decision to reveal
or not reveal by the principal is committed to ex-ante, before the
players choose ﬁrst-round efforts. Moreover, any revelation must be
instantaneous.
If a player succeeds at the end of Round 1, he has done his part of
the project and no longer needs to exert any effort in Round 2. On the
other hand, if he fails at the end of Round 1, he has another
opportunity to complete his task successfully. As in Round 1, the
success probability associatedwith player i's second-round effort ei2 is
p ei2 j i’s task failed in Round 1ð Þ = α if ei2 = 0β if ei2 = 1:

Again, second-round choices are made simultaneously. At the end
of Round 2, the project concludes. If the project succeeds, both players
receive a common reward v; otherwise, they both receive 0.9
We look at two versions of this effort investment game. In one version,
theprincipal announces theoutcomesof theplayers'ﬁrst-roundefforts; in
a second version, ﬁrst-round outcomes are not announced. We will call
these cases disclosure and secrecy, respectively.
Note that because a player always knows his own outcome, a
disclosure policy where the principal's decision to reveal outcomes is
contingent on the realized outcome proﬁle (i.e., reporting is selective)
has no bite: given such a report, a player can either deduce the
true state after the ﬁrst period (i.e., it reduces the game to one of
disclosure), or infer that he is in one of only two states (which is none
other than our secrecy environment). So in our setting, partial
disclosure policies of this sort (as analyzed in the tournament
literature) can be shown to be equivalent to one of our information
environments.10
3. Disclosure
In this version of the game, the principal announces, before Round
2 starts, the outcomes of the players' ﬁrst-round efforts. Denote
“success” by S and “failure” by F. Further, denote the principal's
announcement by a=(a1,a2), where ai∈{S,F}, i=1,2, is the outcome
of player i's ﬁrst-round effort choice. The announcements are assumed
to be truthful.
We will analyze the two-round effort investment game backwards,
using Markov perfect equilibrium (or, MPE) as the solution concept, as
deﬁned in Maskin and Tirole (2001). Formally, strategies that depend
only on the payoff-relevant “state” of the game, rather than the entire
“history”, are known as Markov strategies, alternatively stationary
strategies. In the disclosure game formulation with observable efforts,
ﬁrst-round outcomes are of direct relevance to determine the payoffs
from the players' efforts in the second round and thus called the state,
whereas ﬁrst-round efforts can be considered as “bygones”, or history,
unless players use them to play history-dependent strategies (that
Maskin and Tirole call “bootstrapping”) in the second round;11 so a state
in our application can be associated with more than one history, and a
history can lead to anyofmultiple states. (Later in the secrecygamewith
observable efforts the history and the state will coincide, to be deﬁned
by ﬁrst-round efforts.) Any subgame perfect equilibrium (or, SPE) in
Markov strategies is calledMarkov perfect equilibrium. In this paper,we
will consider only pure strategy equilibrium.
We want to construct the following equilibrium:
Round 2: if both players fail in Round 1, each will choose to shirk in
Round 2; if only one player succeeds in Round 1, then the other player
exerts effort in Round 2.
Round 1: both players exert effort in the ﬁrst round.
We call the second-round, continuation strategy by a player in the
above speciﬁcation, the reinforcement strategy, and denote it by
e˜i2 að Þ; i = 1;2.
The reinforcement strategy is one of several outcome–contingent
strategies a player may adopt in the second round.
Now start with Round 2. A player who failed in the ﬁrst round
needs to consider two subgames:
• Both players failed in the ﬁrst round;
• He alone failed in the ﬁrst round.
(It should be clear that any two subgames with the same ﬁrst-
round outcomes but different ﬁrst-round actions are the same, as they
present identical strategic choices in the subgame and payoffs for any
player.)
In the ﬁrst subgame (call it G) both players simultaneously choose
efforts with the payoff to player i, given his effort ei2 and player j's
effort ej2, given by
ui2ðei2; ej2Þ = pi ei2ð Þpjðej2Þv−cei2; i≠j;
and summarized as follows:
For the remainder of this section and the paper, we make the
following assumption:
Assumption 1. The parameters α ,β,v and c are such that the game G
has two Nash equilibria, eG = 0;0ð Þ and eG = 1;1ð Þ. That is, knowing
that one's partner has failed in Round 1, a player (who also failed in
Round 1) would shirk if the other player shirks and would exert effort
if the other player exerts effort.9 Common value is a reasonable description if the principal (or the institution
organizing the project) gives identical outcome–contingent rewards. The analysis can
be easily extended to differential rewards.
10 Gershkov and Perry (2009) consider only binary revelation, disclosure or secrecy,
whereas both Aoyagi (2010) and Goltsman and Mukherjee (2011) additionally allow
for partial disclosure. Earlier Prat (2005) and Levy (2007a) considered only full
disclosure or complete secrecy.
11 In the introduction of their article, Maskin and Tirole point out the extensive focus
on history-independent/Markov strategies in the applied game theory literature.
Further, they provide various justiﬁcations, including bounded rationality, for the
appeal of Markov equilibrium.
Fig. 1. Simultaneous-move game G.
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Thus, in the ﬁrst subgame, a player does not have a unique optimal
action in the second round. The following conditions are both
necessary and sufﬁcient for Assumption 1 to hold:
α2v≥ αβv−c; i:e:; c≥ α β−αð Þv; ð1Þ
and
β2v−c≥αβv; i:e:; β β−αð Þv≥ c; ð2Þ
with at least one of the inequalities strict, since α b β.
Condition (2) implies that
β−αð Þv−c N 0; i:e:; βv−c N αv: ð3Þ
In other words, a player would strictly prefer to work rather than
shirk if, after the ﬁrst round, he has failed but he knows that his
partner has succeeded. Thus the assumption that eG = 1;1ð Þ implies a
unique optimal action in the second subgame.
Thus, by Assumption 1 and the implied condition (3), the rein-
forcement strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium (or,NE) along each
subgame. Importantly, in the reinforcement strategy, we assume that
if the players reach the game G then eG = 0;0ð Þ will be played
although β2v−c≥α2v (i.e., the payoff-dominant NE, eG = 1;1ð Þ, is
not chosen). By committing to shirk if the other player has failed, both
players are mutually enhancing their incentives to exert efforts in the
ﬁrst round. Coordinating on this inferior equilibrium in the second
round thus acts as a disciplining device, which is a standardmethod in
the repeated/dynamic games literature to induce cooperation.12
Let us now fold the game back to Round 1, assuming that the
players will choose the reinforcement strategy. Denote the strategy
space of the simultaneous-move game in Round 1 byΣ={0,1}×{0,1}.
For player 1's payoff calculations, consider the various continuation
possibilities following any ﬁrst-round strategies (e11,e21):
• a=(S,S) with probability p(e11)p(e21). Both players receive v.
• a=(S,F) with probability p(e11)(1−p(e21)). No further action is
taken by player 1; however, he has to wait one more round (during
which player 2 makes another attempt at completing his task) for
his payoff to be realized. Note that player 1's payoff will depend on
player 2's second-round effort choice, e22. Player 2, for his part, will
choose the action that will give him the higher payoff, given that
player 1 has succeeded in his task; his payoff from each second-
round action following the outcome/announcement a=(S,F) is
u2 S; Fð Þ; e22ð Þ = αv if e22 = 0βv−c if e22 = 1:

By condition (3), following the outcome (S,F) player 2 will choose
e22=1 in Round 2; consequently, player 1 will receive the payoff βv.
• a=(F,S) with probability (1−p(e11))p(e21). No further action is
taken by player 2. By the same argument as in the immediately
preceding case, player 1 will choose e12=1 in Round 2, for a payoff
to player 1 of βv−c.
• a=(F,F) with probability (1−p(e11))(1−p(e21)). The game G is
played. The resulting equilibrium is eG = 0;0ð Þ, and player 1 receives
α2v.
So the expected payoff of player 1 in the ﬁrst-round, simultaneous-
move game for each (e11,e21)∈Σ is
EuD11 e11; e21ð Þ = p e11ð Þp e21ð Þv + p e11ð Þ 1−p e21ð Þð Þβv
+ 1−p e11ð Þð Þp e21ð Þ βv−cð Þ
+ 1−p e11ð Þð Þ 1−p e21ð Þð Þα2v−ce11:
ð4Þ
Remark 1. Note that the payoff in (4) is calculated assuming that the
players play some speciﬁc Nash equilibrium (or sequentially rational)
strategies in the continuation games, whether the continuation games
are on or off the equilibrium path. In particular, we do not write the
payoffs to be contingent on ﬁrst-round actions where players select
different NE in the continuation game G depending on actions. Fixing
an equilibrium (or a sequentially rational strategy) in any subgame is
due to our restriction that the players play only Markov strategies.
Denote the reduced one-shot game, when there is disclosure, by
GD1 . For convenience, let Eu11D (0,0)=x, Eu11D (1,0)=w, Eu11D (0,1)=y,
and Eu11D (1,1)=z (by symmetry, player 2's expected payoffs in the
reduced game are similarly deﬁned). Then the ﬁrst-round efforts
under disclosure are given by the NE of GD1 :
Using (4), write
z = β2v + β 1−βð Þβv + 1−βð Þβ βv−cð Þ + 1−βð Þ 1−βð Þα2v−c;
y = αβv + α 1−βð Þβv + 1−αð Þβ βv−cð Þ + 1−αð Þ 1−βð Þα2v:
Assuming players choose the reinforcement strategies e˜i2 að Þ, an NE in
the reduced game will involve both players exerting effort in the ﬁrst
round, that is, eGD1
= 1;1ð Þ (this will then constitute an MPE in the
extensive-form game with disclosure) if and only if
z≥ y
i:e:; β−αð Þβv + β−αð Þ 1−βð Þβv−c≥ β−αð Þβ βv−cð Þ + β−αð Þ 1−βð Þα2v
i:e:;
β−αð Þ 2β−α2
 
1−βð Þ
h i
1−β β−αð Þ v≥ c
i:e:; β−αð Þg α;βð Þv≥ c;
ð5Þ
where g α;βð Þ =
2β−α2
 
1−βð Þ
1−β β−αð Þ .
Thus, we obtain the following result:
Lemma 1. Under the policy of disclosure, 1;1; e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ will be an
MPE if and only if the cost parameter c satisﬁes (1), (2), and (5), i.e., c
satisﬁes, for given v, α, and β,
α β−αð Þv≤c≤min β β−αð Þv; β−αð Þg α;βð Þvf g; ð6Þ
12 Che and Yoo (2001), for instance, recognize that “the team equilibrium concept
relies on the agents' abilities to select the worst possible (subgame-perfect)
punishment.”
Fig. 2. Simultaneous-move game GD1 .
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with at least one of the inequalities strict if min{β(β−α)v, (β−α) g
(α,β)v}=β(β−α)v.
Example 1. Suppose that β=0.7, α=0.3, and v=10. Then it is easy to
check that Assumption 1 is satisﬁed (i.e., (1) and (2)will hold) if and only
if c∈[1.2,2.8], and that 1;1;e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ is anMPE under disclosure if
and only if c∈[1.2,2.18333] (so that (5) also holds) as shown in Lemma1.
Note that relative to the continuation game G, inducing efforts by both
players in theﬁrst round ismore difﬁcult (the upperboundof c shrinks) as
players can take a chance by shirking early on in the play. The cost cannot
be too low either as otherwise exerting effort in the second round
becomes a dominant strategy and the reinforcement strategy will no
longer be an NE in the continuation game. □
4. Secrecy: better or worse?
We assume, as in the previous section, that the players' efforts are
observable. Our main concern is about the transparency of outcomes.
Also, we continue to impose Assumption 1, so conditions (1) and (2)
(and by implication (3)) will be assumed to hold. Towards the end, we
will relax the assumption on observability of efforts.
When the principal commits to secrecy of outcomes, the game
proceeds as follows:
Round 1. Players simultaneously choose their ﬁrst-round efforts,
ei1∈{0,1}, i=1,2. If a player succeeds in the ﬁrst round, then he
exerts no further effort; if the player fails, then he proceeds to
Round 2 with the information gained during an Interim period.
Interim period. First-round efforts, e1=(e11,e21)∈{(0,0), (0,1),(1,0),
(1,1)}, are observed by both players (Transparency of efforts, the
default scenario). Further, each player knows the outcome of his
ﬁrst attempt, i.e., whether he has succeeded or failed, but does not
know the outcome of the other player's attempt. However, from ej1
player i can infer that player j succeeded with probability p(ej1)
and failed with probability (1−p(ej1)).
Round 2. A player again either shirks or exerts effort, and the expected
continuation payoffs are calculated based on his beliefs about the
other player's success.
At the end of Round 2 the two tasks' ﬁnal outcomes determine the
project's overall outcome and the players receive their payoffs. ∥
The game tree is presented in Fig. 3.
We solve this extensive-form game backwards just like in the
disclosure game, but this time the Markov restriction on strategies
does not have any bite because the history (deﬁned by ﬁrst-round
efforts) and the state are one and the same thing; ﬁrst-round efforts
will deﬁne the state, with outcomes not disclosed anymore. Therefore
the solution concept is SPE. Although in this game SPE and MPE are
equivalent, we prefer to use the former terminology.
Fixing Round 1 efforts at any e1=(e11,e21), consider the continua-
tion game for player 2, i.e., the game he would face having failed in
Round 1.
• Player 2's payoff from second-round effort choice, e22, depends on
his beliefs about player 1's success or failure in Round 1. Given e11,
player 2's expected payoff from e22=0 is
Eu22 e22 = 0ð Þ = p e11ð Þαv + 1−p e11ð Þð Þα
2v if e12 = 0
p e11ð Þαv + 1−p e11ð Þð Þαβv if e12 = 1;

and his expected payoff from e22=1 is
Eu22 e22 = 1ð Þ =
p e11ð Þ βv−cð Þ + 1−p e11ð Þð Þ αβv−cð Þ if e12 = 0
p e11ð Þ βv−cð Þ + 1−p e11ð Þð Þ β2v−c
 
if e12 = 1:
(
Fig. 3. The secrecy game.
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• Similarly, if player 1 fails in Round 1 and knowing that player 2
chose e21, his expected payoff from e12=0 is
Eu12 e12 = 0ð Þ = p e21ð Þαv + 1−p e21ð Þð Þα
2v if e22 = 0
p e21ð Þαv + 1−p e21ð Þð Þαβv if e22 = 1;

and his expected payoff from e12=1 is
Eu12 e22 = 1ð Þ =
p e21ð Þ βv−cð Þ + 1−p e21ð Þð Þ αβv−cð Þ if e22 = 0
p e21ð Þ βv−cð Þ + 1−p e21ð Þð Þ β2v−c
 
if e22 = 1:
(
Denote the “simultaneous-move” game that is played in the
second round when one or both players failed in the ﬁrst round but
are only able to observe e1, by GSe1 . Based on our derivations above, the
game GSe1 takes the form of Fig. 4.
Remark 2. Under maintained assumptions, GSe1 has no asymmetric
(pure strategy) equilibrium.
The strategy proﬁle (1,0) is an asymmetric equilibrium of Ge1S only
if
p e11ð Þ αvð Þ + 1−p e11ð Þð Þ αβvð Þ ≥ p e11ð Þ βv−cð Þ + 1−p e11ð Þð Þ β2v−c
 
;
i:e:; 0 ≥ p e11ð Þ β−αð Þv−cð Þ + 1−p e11ð Þð Þ β β−αð Þv−cð Þ;
which contradicts conditions (2) and (3), combined. By the same
argument, the strategy proﬁle (0,1) cannot be an NE.
We see that asymmetric equilibria do not arise in any GSe1 .
Moreover, for any player i, if player j chooses ej1=1, player i is
strictly better off choosing ei1=1 instead of ei1=0, applying (2) and
(3) and the fact that 0bαbβb1. We can therefore state the following
result:
Corollary 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then eGSe1
= 1;1ð Þ for any e1.
This should not be surprising. Recall that, by Assumption 1,
eG = 1;1ð Þ, so in the case of disclosure when both players fail in
Round 1 it is in the best interest of any player to exert effort in the
second round provided that the other player does the same. With
secrecy, such an incentive remains, and in fact it is sharpened, since
now he believes that his partner's ﬁrst attempt, even a perfunctory
one, might have succeeded with some probability (in which case
making sure his own task is completed by exerting effort surely pays).
Let us now turn to the ﬁrst round. Denote the reduced one-shot
game, when there is secrecy, by GS1, and a strategy proﬁle under
secrecy by eGS1 = e
S
11; e
S
21; e
S
12; e
S
22
 
, where ei2S is an unsuccessful player
i's second-round action. Denote the equilibrium (or, SPE) of this
reduced game by eGS1
. Analyzing ﬁrst-round choices and their
corresponding continuation games then leads to the following results.
Lemma 2. Consider the game under secrecy. Suppose Assumption 1
holds. Then:
[L2a] eGS1
=(1,1;1,1) (i.e., both players exerting effort in the ﬁrst
round, followed by any player with an unsuccessful ﬁrst attempt
exerting effort in the second round, is an SPE) if and only if
c ≤ β β−αð Þ 2−βð Þ 1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v: ð7Þ
[L2b] In the continuation game GS1;1ð Þ, (1,1) is the unique (strict)
dominant strategy equilibrium.13 That is, for each player, exerting
effort in the second round regardless of the other player's second-
round action (if the other player has indeed failed in the ﬁrst round) is
a strict best response in GS1;1ð Þ.
In contrast to the reinforcement strategy in the disclosure case
where a player exerts effort in the second round only if the other player
succeeded in the ﬁrst round, in the continuation game G(1,1)S exerting
effort is a “(strictly) dominant strategy”, i.e., any playerwould do strictly
better to exert effort (rather than shirk) even though his partner shirks.
This is because the probability of success of his partner's ﬁrst-round
action (which was to put in effort) is large enough such that the
additional payoff from exerting effort, given that the other player has
succeeded, outweighs the loss from putting in effort when the other
player has in fact failed (recall, (0,0) is anNE in the game G) and chooses
to shirk in the second round.14 Note that the dominance of effort over
shirking in the continuation game is possible because of secrecy.
Lemma 3. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then under secrecy,
eGS1
= 0;0; 1;1ð Þ (i.e., both players shirking in the ﬁrst round, followed
by any player with an unsuccessful ﬁrst attempt exerting effort in the
second round, is an SPE) if and only if
β−αð Þ β + α 1−βð Þ½  1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v ≤ c: ð8Þ
We are ready to report one of our main results.
Proposition 1 (Secrecy dominates Disclosure). Suppose that, given
α, β, v and c, and αbβ, the following conditions hold:
α β−αð Þv ≤ c ≤ β β−αð Þv ð9Þ
with at least one inequality strict (which is Assumption 1), and
c b
β−αð Þ β + α 1−βð Þ½  1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v: ð10Þ
13 See Osborne (2004, Section 2.7.8) for a deﬁnition of strict equilibrium.
14 The continuation game under secrecy is an imperfect information game: in the
second round, a player may be the only player choosing an effort decision and yet not
know that the other player has succeeded in the ﬁrst round.
Fig. 4. Simultaneous-move game GSe1 .
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Then:
[P1a] Under disclosure, eGD1
= 1;1; e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ: both players
exerting effort in the ﬁrst round, followed by the reinforcement
strategy, is an MPE. Also, eGD1
= 1;1; 1;1ð Þ.
[P1b] Under secrecy, the unique SPE is eGS1
= 1;1; 1;1ð Þ.
Condition (9), which is Assumption 1, allows us to determine the
equilibrium thatwill be played in any continuation game (by Corollary 1).
Given that (9) holds, condition (10) supports the disclosure equilibria
eGD1
= 1;1;e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ and eGD1 = 1;1; 1;1ð Þ, aswell as uniqueness of
the secrecy equilibrium eGS1
= 1;1; 1;1ð Þ.
The domination result in Proposition 1 is in a weak sense: secrecy
retains the best equilibrium under disclosure and eliminates all worse
effort pairs. Further discussion of Proposition 1 is postponed until
after Proposition 2. Next we consider the possibility of disclosure
dominating secrecy.
In the disclosure case, denote the subgame where player i is the
only unsuccessful player following the ﬁrst round by F i. Other than
the reinforcement strategy e˜i2 að Þ (in which player i shirks in G and
exerts effort in F i), there are three other possible continuation
strategies under disclosure for player i when he has failed in the ﬁrst
round: (i) shirk in both G and F i; (ii) exert effort in G and shirk in F i;
and (iii) exert effort in both G and F i. By condition (3) (which follows
from Assumption 1), a player would prefer to exert effort rather than
shirk in F i. Thus (i) and (ii) cannot be part of an MPE, and the only
permissible continuation strategies for a player under disclosure are
e˜i2 að Þ and (iii) above (call this strategy eˆi2 að Þ). Players may follow
asymmetric continuation strategies. Therefore, under disclosure the
possible strategy proﬁles in the second round are e˜i2 að Þ;e˜j2 að Þ
 
,
eˆi2 að Þ; eˆj2 að Þ
 
, and e˜i2 að Þ; eˆj2 að Þ
 
. However, e˜i2 að Þ; eˆj2 að Þ
 
(i.e., one
player following the reinforcement strategy while the other exerts
effort irrespective of his partner's outcome) cannot be part of a
disclosure MPE. If it were, then (1,0) would be an NE in the game G,
which is an impossibility given that αbβ, since this requires (refer to
Fig. 1):
αβv−c ≥ α2v ⇒ α β−αð Þv ≥ c
and αβv ≥ β2v−c ⇒ c ≥ β β−αð Þv:
Therefore, other than 1;1;e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ, the remaining disclosure
equilibrium candidates are:
½1 1;1; eˆ12 að Þ; eˆ22 að Þð Þ; ½2 1;0; e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ; ½3 1;0; eˆ12 að Þ; eˆ22 að Þð Þ;
½4 0;1;e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ; ½5 0;1; eˆ12 að Þ; eˆ22 að Þð Þ; ½6 0;0;e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ;
½7 0;0; eˆ12 að Þ; eˆ22 að Þð Þ:
Now consider the equilibrium (0,0;1,1) under secrecy (which
obtains under condition (8)), and compare each of the candidate
equilibria under disclosure listed above to this strategy proﬁle. In
candidate equilibrium [7], both players shirk in the ﬁrst round, and
each player, should he fail, exerts effort in the second round
irrespective of the other player's outcome; thus this strategy proﬁle,
and (0,0;1,1) under secrecy, are the same. The strategy proﬁles
[1], [3], and [5] are clearly superior: in the continuation strategy in
each of these proﬁles, both players exert effort irrespective of the
other player's outcome (same as in (0,0;1,1) under secrecy) and at
least one player is being proactive by exerting effort in the earlier
round (whereas in (0,0;1,1) under secrecy, both players shirk in
Round 1). The remaining strategy proﬁles (namely, 1;0; e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ,
0;1;e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ, and 0;0;e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ) are either inferior, or do
not yield anobvious comparison.We cannowmake the following claim.
Proposition 2 (Disclosure dominates Secrecy). Suppose that, given
α, β, v and c, and αbβ, the following conditions hold:
α β−αð Þv ≤ c ≤ β β−αð Þv ð11Þ
with at least one inequality strict (which is Assumption 1),
c N
β β−αð Þ 2−βð Þ 1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v; ð12Þ
and
c b min β−αð Þg α;βð Þv;
β−αð Þ 2β−α2
 
1−αð Þ− β−αð Þ
h i
1−α β−αð Þ v
8<
:
9=
;
= min β−αð Þg α;βð Þv; β−αð Þh α;βð Þvf g;
ð13Þ
where g(α,β) is deﬁned in Section 3 and h α;βð Þ = 2β−α
2ð Þ 1−αð Þ− β−αð Þ½ 
1−α β−αð Þ .
Then:
[P2a] (Proactive outcome) Under disclosure, eGD1
= 1;1; e˜12 að Þ;ð
e˜22 að ÞÞ: both players exerting effort in the ﬁrst round, followed by
the reinforcement strategy, is an MPE.
[P2b] (Opportunistic play) Under secrecy, eGS1
= 0; 0; 1;1ð Þ.
[P2c] Under secrecy, eGS1
≠ 1;1; 1;1ð Þ, eGS1≠ 1;1; 1; 0ð Þ, e

GS1
≠ 1; 1; 0;1ð Þ,
eGS1
≠ 1;0; 1;1ð Þ, eGS1≠ 1;0; 1;0ð Þ, and e

GS1
≠ 1;0; 0;1ð Þ: strategy
proﬁles that involve at least one player exerting effort in the ﬁrst
round, followed by at least one player exerting effort in the second
round, cannot be SPE.
[P2d] Under disclosure, eGD1
≠ 1;0; e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ, eGD1≠ 0;1; e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ,
and eGD1
≠ 0;0; e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ.
GivenAssumption1 (condition (11)), the rest of the conditions facilitate
the following. Condition (13) supports eGD1
= 1;1; e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ, and (12)
supports eGS1
= 0;0; 1;1ð Þ. Secrecy SPE that are superior to the
disclosure equilibrium eGD1
= 1;1; e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ (identiﬁed in [P2c]) are
eliminated, using either (11) or (12). Finally, disclosure MPE that are
inferior to eGS1
= 0;0; 1;1ð Þ (identiﬁed in [P2d]) are eliminated, through
condition (13).
Proposition 1 presents plausible scenarios where secrecy dom-
inates disclosure, whereas Proposition 2 presents the opposite
possibility.15 The intuitions are as follows. In the disclosure MPE,
efforts are sustained in the ﬁrst round because of the threat of
punishment (following mutual failures in the ﬁrst round players
coordinate on the (0,0) Nash equilibrium rather than (1,1) equilib-
rium in the continuation game), whereas with secrecy, any of two
possibilities may happen. First, early activity by both players (i.e.,
(1,1) in the ﬁrst round) may be encouraged although there is no
implied penalty for shirking in the form of playing the ‘bad’
equilibrium in the continuation game (as in the disclosure case),
mainly to keep the other player motivated should he need to make a
second attempt. If c is moderately low, then (1,1;1,1) remains the
unique SPE because savings in effort costs by shirking in the ﬁrst
round generally do not justify the fall in expected beneﬁts for a player
along alternative continuation paths (ﬁrst-round deviation by a player
can be followed up by more than one strategy in the second round).
On the other hand, for c large enough, a player would rather save in
ﬁrst-round effort costs and take a chance with the ﬁrst-round draw
and put in the effort in the last round if ﬁrst round proves
unsuccessful, giving rise to (0,0;1,1) equilibrium. Note that because
15 The domination in Proposition 1 is in the weak sense, whereas in Proposition 2 we
can apply only strict domination. While the secrecy equilibrium strategies, (1,1 ;1,1),
translate naturally in the disclosure game, there is no directly comparable strategy
proﬁle in the secrecy game corresponding to the disclosure equilibrium strategies
1;1; e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þ
 
.
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of high c it is possible that, under secrecy, (0,0;0,0) is an SPE, which
further serves to strengthen the dominance of the disclosure
equilibrium (i.e., 1;1;e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ).16
Example 2. [Double-edged transparency]. Suppose that, as in Example
1 in Section 3, β=0.7, α=0.3, and v=10. Recall that, for these
parameter values, α(β−α)v=1.2 and min{β(a−α)v, (β−α)g
(α,β)v}=(β−α)g(α,β)v=2.18333, so that 1;1; e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ is
an MPE under disclosure if and only if c∈[1.2,2.18333] (refer to
Lemma 1).
According to the critical values for c identiﬁed in Propositions 1
and 2, we can split the interval, c∈ [1.2,2.18333], further into three
sub-intervals depending on whether one or both of the secrecy
SPE analyzed here emerges. We plot these critical values for c
against α∈ (0,β) in Fig. 5.17 One can check that at α=0.3,
β−αð Þ β + α 1−βð Þ½  1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v = 1:58,
β β−αð Þ 2−βð Þ 1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v = 1:82,
and (β−α)h(α,β)v=2.35 (these bounds appear in conditions (10),
(12) and (13), respectively). Therefore,
• Secrecy dominates disclosure if c∈ [1.2,1.58), and
• disclosure dominates secrecy if c∈(1.82,2.18333);
• if c∈ [1.58,1.82] (as indicated by the cross-hatched region), then
under secrecy both (1,1;1,1) and (0,0;1,1) are SPE.
In the intermediate range c∈ [1.58,1.82], the secrecy equilibrium
(1,1;1,1) is better than the disclosure equilibrium 1;1;e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ,
while the secrecy equilibrium (0,0;1,1) is worse. Thus for these
intermediate c values, a clear ranking is not possible: secrecy may
either enhance or weaken players' effort incentives.
Overall, not disclosing outcomes helps to eliminate a player's
tendency to give up on the project following failure in the early stage,
whereas disclosure of outcomes incentivizes players to be pro-active
in exerting efforts early and be successful in their own tasks so that
others are encouraged to follow suit. □
Role of Assumption 1. Both players exerting effort in the ﬁrst round
in our constructed equilibrium (under disclosure) is achieved when
there are multiple equilibria in the continuation game, G, but the
players coordinate on the bad equilibrium eG = 0;0ð Þ. Somewhat
surprisingly, the case for both players exerting effort in the ﬁrst round
becomes weaker if, instead, one assumes that (0,0) is the unique
equilibrium in G. The reason is, shirking by both players being the
unique NE in G implies that the effort cost, c, must be rather high,
which in turn weakens ﬁrst-round effort incentives.
Unobservable efforts. Our analysis so far relied on the assumption of
mutual observability of efforts. What happens if efforts are not
observable is a natural question to ask.
First note that when outcomes are disclosed, information on ﬁrst-
round efforts is irrelevant – all that matters to a player in Round 2, if he
has not been successful in Round 1, is the outcome of the other player's
ﬁrst-round effort rather than the effort itself or his own ﬁrst-round
effort. Thus, as noted earlier in Section 3, any two subgames following
identical outcomes but different ﬁrst-round actions are identical one-
shot games. So, in analyzing any particular subgame, non-observability
of efforts makes no difference: theNE efforts under observable and non-
observable efforts would coincide. Second, when viewed at the start of
the game in the ﬁrst round, on the face of it observability of efforts may
potentially make a difference: if a player were to deviate in the ﬁrst
round by choosing a different effort level from the one speciﬁed in a
hypothetical equilibrium, then in the second round, for any subgame to
follow depending on outcomes, the players may adopt strategies
different from that speciﬁed in the posited equilibrium. However, our
equilibrium constructions (and eliminations) in the disclosure game
with observable efforts relied on players choosing the same NE (or
sequentially rational strategies) in second-round subgames irrespective
of ﬁrst-round actions (theMarkov strategy assumption). So, any lack of
knowledge of ﬁrst-round efforts isn't going to alter our original
equilibrium construction (or elimination) arguments. Therefore, the
set of equilibrium under observable and non-observable efforts will
coincide, implyingpart [P1a] of Proposition1 andparts [P2a] and [P2d] of
Proposition 2 would extend to the case when efforts are not observable.
For the secrecy game, however, effort observability becomes more
of an issue. When team members are able to observe ﬁrst-round
efforts but not outcomes, they condition their second-round strategies
on ﬁrst-round efforts. So the subgames are deﬁned interms of ﬁrst-
round efforts rather than the outcomes; the players engage in a
repeated (efforts) contribution game, earlier denoted by GS1.
When efforts are not observable and outcomes are not disclosed,
each player privately makes two attempts at his task without any
information to condition his decision on in the second round (except
his own effort outcome in the ﬁrst round). Thus, the game is a
simultaneous (efforts) contribution game, to be referred simply as GS,
with NE as the equilibrium deﬁnition.
In the repeated efforts game, being able to condition the second-
round strategies on ﬁrst-round efforts can create new equilibria that are
not available under the simultaneous move game, or remove existing
equilibria of the simultaneousmove gameby introducing strategies that
lead to proﬁtable deviations. So how the equilibrium sets in the two
alternative game forms under secrecy differ is not, a priori, clear.
A formal analysis of the simultaneous contribution game yields the
following result.
Lemma 4. If c satisﬁes the conditions in Proposition 2, then disclosure
dominates secrecy, both with and without effort observability.
On the other hand, the dominance of secrecy over disclosure under
the conditions of Proposition 1 may fail when efforts are no longer
observable. This is because with unobservable efforts, (1,1;1,1) may
no longer be the unique secrecy equilibrium.
Lemma 5. If c satisﬁes the conditions in Proposition 1, then secrecy conti-
nues to dominate disclosure when efforts are not observable if and only if
c b β−αð Þ α + 1−αð Þα½ v: ð14Þ
One potential downside of non-observability of efforts in the
secrecy game is the strong temptation of shirking, especially in the
early stage of the game. For instance, when players are considering to
play (0,0 ;0,0) in a hypothetical equilibrium, there is no way a player
can deviate and exert an effort in the ﬁrst round and ensure that it
would be reciprocated by the other player in the second round. As a
16 Note that (1,1;0,0) is not an SPE under secrecy, by Assumption 1.
17 The ﬁgure is generated in ‘Mathematica’.
Fig. 5. Double-edged transparency for v=10, β=0.7, and α=0.3.
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result, (0,0;0,0) may arise in equilibrium. While this is possible for
some parameter conﬁgurations, if the effort cost is reasonably small as
deﬁned by (14), secrecy may continue to dominate disclosure when
efforts are not observable.
Our two main results under observable efforts can thus be
extended, as follows.
Proposition 3. (Transparency with unobservable efforts). Suppose
that the players' efforts are not observable. Then transparency of outcomes
can boost or weaken effort incentives under appropriate conditions:
[P3a] If c satisﬁes the conditions in Proposition 1, then secrecy continues
to dominate disclosure if and only if c b (β−α)[α+(1−α)α]v.
[P3b] If c satisﬁes the conditions in Proposition 2, then disclosure
continues to dominate secrecy.
Below we demonstrate the countervailing implications of trans-
parency, as formalized in Proposition 3, by extending our Example 2.
Example 3. Refer to Fig. 5, where we illustrate double-edged
transparency with observable efforts for β=0.7, α=0.3, and v=10.
Using Lemma 1 and the conditions in Propositions 1 and 2, we showed
that 1;1;e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ is an MPE under disclosure if and only if
c∈ [1.2,2.18333], and that, within this interval,
• secrecy dominates disclosure if c∈ [1.2,1.58),
• disclosure dominates secrecy if c∈(1.82,2.18333); and
• if c∈ [1.58,1.82], an unambiguous ranking is not possible.
Note that (β−α)[α+α(1−α)]v=2.04, so the additional constraint
(14) is not binding. Therefore, using Proposition 3, all the aforemen-
tioned results still hold when efforts are not observable.
Next, consider α=0.2, with the rest of the parameter values
unchanged. It is easy to check that α(β−α)v=1 and min{β(β−α)v,
(β−α)g(α,β)v}=(β−α)g(α,β)v=3.13846, so that 1;1; e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ
(refer to Lemma 1) is an equilibrium under disclosure if and only
if c∈ [1,3.13846], both when efforts are observable and when
not observable. Using Propositions 1 and 2, in particular the conditions
(10), (12) and (13), respectively, one can check that at α=0.2,
β−αð Þ β + α 1−βð Þ½  1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v = 2:28,
β β−αð Þ 2−βð Þ 1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v = 2:73,
and (β−α)h(α,β)v=3.27. Therefore, when efforts are observable, within
the interval [1,3.13846],
• secrecy dominates disclosure if c∈ [1,2.28),
• disclosure dominates secrecy if c∈(2.73,3.13846); and
• if c∈ [2.28,2.73] then under secrecy both (1,1;1,1) and (0,0;1,1)
are SPE, so an unambiguous ranking is not possible.
Now let us decompose the same interval c∈ [1,3.13846] when efforts
are not observable. By part [P3b] of Proposition 3, disclosure continues
to dominate secrecy if c∈(2.73,3.13846). This time, however, since
(β−α)[α+α(1−α)]v=1.8b2.28, by part [P3a] of Proposition 3,
secrecy dominates disclosure if and only if c∈ [1,1.8). If c∈ [1.8,2.28)
then under secrecy both (1,1 ;1,1) and (0,0;0,0) are NE, and if
c∈ [2.28,2.73] then (1,1;1,1), (0,0;1,1) and (0,0;0,0) are all NE.
Thus the range of c over which secrecy dominates disclosure shrinks
due to the additional constraint in (14), and the intermediate range
with ambiguous ranking expands from c∈ [2.28,2.73] to c∈ [1.8,2.73].
With a lower value of α, non-observability of efforts has thrown in the
additional shirking equilibrium.
We have thus shown that as α is varied, although regions of c values
exhibiting particular types of dominance may be affected (which is
expected), our basic hypothesis about the double-edged nature of
transparency remains validated even when efforts are not observable.
One can provide similar illustrations for different values of β. □
5. Conclusion
Often failure of important decisions is attributed to lack of
transparency of procedures or relevant information. Or if one wants
to avert criticisms for failures, giving the defense of having followed a
transparent procedure is not uncommon. Much of the skepticism
about transparency so far have been directed at political applications.
This paper extends the analysis to team problems. The message is a
mixed one — transparency can be good or bad depending on speciﬁc
environment. This suggests that perhaps decision makers should be
left to their own discretion on procedural matters.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 2. [L2a] For e1=(1,1), the continuation game
(summarized in Fig. 4) simpliﬁes to Fig. 6.
First, note that eGS1;1ð Þ
= 1;1ð Þ if and only if
β βv−cð Þ + 1−βð Þ β2v−c
 
≥ β αvð Þ + 1−βð Þαβv
i:e: β β−αð Þ 2−βð Þv≥ c:
ðA:1Þ
Each player's expected payoff from the ﬁrst-round strategy proﬁle
(1,1) (followed by (1,1) in the second round) is
EuS11 1;1; 1; 1ð Þ = EuS21 1;1; 1; 1ð Þ = β2v + β 1−βð Þβv
+ 1−βð Þβ βv−cð Þ + 1−βð Þ2 β2v−c
 
−c:
Now suppose that player 2 deviates to e21=0. By Corollary 1, (1,1)
is an NE in the continuation game GS1;0ð Þ. Then player 2's expected
payoff from the ﬁrst-round strategy proﬁle (1,0) (followed by (1,1) in
the second round) is
EuS21 1;0; 1;1ð Þ = αβv + β 1−αð Þ βv−cð Þ + 1−βð Þα βvð Þ
+ 1−βð Þ 1−αð Þ β2v−c
 
:
Thus,
EuS21 1;1; 1;1ð Þ−EuS21 1;0; 1;1ð Þ = β−αð Þβv + β−αð Þ 1−βð Þβv− β−αð Þβ βv−cð Þ
− β−αð Þ 1−βð Þ β2v−c
 
−c
= β−αð Þ 2−βð Þβv− 2−βð Þβ2v + c
h i
−c
= β−αð Þ 2−βð Þ 1−βð Þβv + c½ −c
= β−αð Þ 2−βð Þ 1−βð Þβv + β−αð Þc−c;
and the deviation is unproﬁtable, i.e., Eu21S (1,1 ;1,1)≥Eu21S (1,0;1,1),
if and only if
β β−αð Þ 2−βð Þ 1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v ≥ c: ðA:2Þ
Therefore, (1,1;1,1) is an SPE with secrecy if and only if (A.1) and
(A.2) hold, i.e.,
c ≤ min β β−αð Þ 2−βð Þv; 1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ
 
β β−αð Þ 2−βð Þv
 	
=
β β−αð Þ 2−βð Þ 1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v:
[L2b] By Corollary 1, eG S1;1ð Þ
= 1;1ð Þ. In fact, a stronger claim is that
eGS1;1ð Þ
= 1;1ð Þ is also a unique “strict dominant strategy” equilibrium
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(see footnote 14 for the nature of the game being considered). To see
this, note that in the continuation game GS1;1ð Þ, exerting effort instead
of shirking yields each player a strictly higher payoff whether his
partner shirks or exerts effort (refer to Fig. 6):
β βv−cð Þ + 1−βð Þ αβv−cð Þ− β αvð Þ + 1−βð Þα2v
 
= β β−αð Þv−c
+ 1−βð Þα β−αð Þv N 0;
and
β βv−cð Þ + 1−βð Þ β2v−c
 
−β αvð Þ− 1−βð Þαβv = β β−αð Þv−c½ 
+ 1−βð Þ β β−αð Þv−c½  N 0:
Both inequalities follow from condition (2). Therefore, both players
exerting effort is the unique strict dominant strategy equilibrium.
□
Proof of Lemma 3. For e1=(0,0), the continuation game (summa-
rized in Fig. 4) simpliﬁes to Fig. 7.
By Corollary 1, (1,1) is an NE of this continuation game. Player 1's
expected payoff when the players choose (0,0) in Round 1 followed
by (1,1) in Round 2, is
EuS11 0;0; 1;1ð Þ = α2v + α 1−αð Þβv + 1−αð Þα βv−cð Þ + 1−αð Þ2 β2v−c
 
:
Suppose that player 1 deviates to e11=1. By Corollary 1, eGS1;0ð Þ
= 1;1ð Þ.
We then see that this deviation results in an expected payoff of
EuS11 1;0; 1;1ð Þ = αβv + β 1−αð Þβv + 1−βð Þα βv−cð Þ
+ 1−βð Þ 1−αð Þ β2v−c
 
−c;
and the deviation is unproﬁtable if and only if
EuS11 1;0; 1; 1ð Þ−EuS11 0;0; 1; 1ð Þ = β−αð Þ αv + 1−αð Þβv−αβv− 1−αð Þβ2v + c
h i
−c
= β−αð Þ 1−βð Þαv + 1−αð Þ 1−βð Þβv + c½ −c
≤ 0;
that is, for given β, v, and α,
β−αð Þ β + α 1−βð Þ½  1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v ≤ c:
Therefore, (0,0 ;1,1) is an SPE with secrecy if and only if
β−αð Þ β + α 1−βð Þ½  1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v ≤ c: □
Proof of Proposition 1. [P1a] Recall that 1;1;e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ will be
anMPE under the policy of disclosure if and only if the cost parameter
c satisﬁes (1) and (2), and (5). The ﬁrst two conditions are
summarized in (9). If (10) holds, then (5) is satisﬁed, since
β−αð Þ β + α 1−βð Þ½  1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v b β−αð Þg α;βð Þv:
β−αð Þg α;βð Þv− β−αð Þ β + α 1−βð Þ½  1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v
=
β−αð Þ 2β−α2
 
1−βð Þ
1−β β−αð Þ v−
β−αð Þ β + α 1−βð Þ½  1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v
=
2β−α2
1−β β−αð Þ−
β + α 1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ
" #
β−αð Þ 1−βð Þv
=
2β−α2
 
1− β−αð Þ½ − β + α 1−βð Þ½  1−β β−αð Þ½ 
1−β β−αð Þ½  1− β−αð Þ½ 
2
4
3
5 β−αð Þ 1−βð Þv
=
2β−α2
 
− β−αð Þ 2β−α2
 
− β+α 1−βð Þ½ + β β−αð Þ β+α 1−βð Þ½ 
1−β β−αð Þ½  1− β−αð Þ½ 
2
4
3
5 β−αð Þ 1−βð Þv
=
2β−α2−β−α + αβ + β−αð Þ β2 + αβ−αβ2−2β + α2
h i
1−β β−αð Þ½  1− β−αð Þ½ 
2
4
3
5 β−αð Þ 1−βð Þv
=
β−α2−α + αβ + β−αð Þ β2 + αβ−αβ2−2β + α2
h i
1−β β−αð Þ½  1− β−αð Þ½ 
2
4
3
5 β−αð Þ 1−βð Þv
=
β−αð Þ + α β−αð Þ + β−αð Þ β2 + αβ−αβ2−2β + α2
h i
1−β β−αð Þ½  1− β−αð Þ½ 
2
4
3
5 β−αð Þ 1−βð Þv
=
β−αð Þ 1−2β + β2 + α + α2 + αβ−αβ2
h i
1−β β−αð Þ½  1− β−αð Þ½ 
2
4
3
5 β−αð Þ 1−βð Þv
=
β−αð Þ 1−βð Þ2 + α 1 + αð Þ + αβ 1−βð Þ
h i
1−β β−αð Þ½  1− β−αð Þ½ 
2
4
3
5 β−αð Þ 1−βð Þv
N 0:
Next we show that the following strategies also constitute anMPE
under disclosure:
Round 1: both players exert effort in the ﬁrst round.
Round 2: any player who fails in Round 1 will exert effort in Round 2,
regardless of the other player's ﬁrst-round outcome or their efforts.
Fig. 6. Simultaneous-move game GS1;1ð Þ .
Fig. 7. Simultaneous-move game GS0;0ð Þ .
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Note that the second-round strategies, like the reinforcement
strategies e˜i2 að Þf g, are consistent with Assumption 1, except that in
contrast to e˜i2 að Þ, both players now choose to coordinate on the “good
equilibrium” whenever they ﬁnd themselves in the one-shot game G.
Also, in the subgame where a player is the only one who failed, the
strategy of exerting effort is sequentially rational as implied by (3).
Therefore, given that the players play in the second round
subgames the NE (or sequentially rational) strategies as speciﬁed,
the expected payoff of player 1 in the ﬁrst-round, simultaneous-move
game for each ﬁrst-round effort proﬁle (e11,e21) under disclosure can
be written as follows:
EuD′11 e11; e21ð Þ = p e11ð Þp e21ð Þv + p e11ð Þ 1−p e21ð Þð Þβv + 1−p e11ð Þð Þp e21ð Þ βv−cð Þ
+ 1−p e11ð Þð Þ 1−p e21ð Þð Þ β2v−c
 
−ce11:
Let Eu11D′(1,1)=Eu21D′(1,1)=z′ and Eu11D′(0,1)=Eu21D′(1,0)=y′:
z′ = β2v + β 1−βð Þβv + 1−βð Þβ βv−cð Þ + 1−βð Þ 1−βð Þ β2v−c
 
−c;
y′ = αβv + α 1−βð Þβv + 1−αð Þβ βv−cð Þ + 1−αð Þ 1−βð Þ β2v−c
 
:
Therefore, in the reduced one-shot game under disclosure, (1,1) is an
NE if and only if z′≥y′; that is,
β−αð Þβv + β−αð Þ 1−βð Þβv−c ≥ β−αð Þβ βv−cð Þ + β−αð Þ 1−βð Þ β2v−c
 
i:e:;
β−αð Þ 2β−β2
 
1−βð Þ
h i
1− β−αð Þ v ≥ c:
ðA:3Þ
But
β−αð Þ 2β−β2ð Þ 1−βð Þ½ 
1− β−αð Þ v N
β−αð Þ β + α 1−βð Þ½  1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v, since (2β−β
2)−
(β+α(1−β))=β−β2−α(1−β)=β(1−β)−α(1−β)=(β−α)
(1−β)N0. Therefore, if condition (10) holds, then (A.3) holds as well.
[P1b] First note that
β β−αð Þ 2−βð Þ 1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v N
β−αð Þ β + α 1−βð Þ½  1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v: ðA:4Þ
This is because
β β−αð Þ 2−βð Þ 1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v−
β−αð Þ β + α 1−βð Þ½  1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v
= β 2−βð Þ− β + α 1−βð Þ½ ð Þ β−αð Þ 1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v
 
= 2β−β2−β−α 1−βð Þ
  β−αð Þ 1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v
 
= β 1−βð Þ−α 1−βð Þð Þ β−αð Þ 1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v
 
= β−αð Þ 1−βð Þ β−αð Þ 1−βð Þ
1− β−αð Þ v
 
N 0:
Therefore, if (10) holds then (7) is satisﬁed, and using Lemma 2 (in
particular [L2a]) we conclude that (1,1;1,1) is an SPE under secrecy.
Recall that none of the continuation games under secrecy have
asymmetric equilibria (see Remark 2 in Section 4). Thus none of the
strategy proﬁles (1,1;1,0), (1,1;0,1), (1,0;1,0), (1,0;0,1), (0,1;1,0),
(0,1;0,1), (0,0;1,0), and (0,0;0,1) can be SPE.
Next, consider the strategy proﬁles (1,1;0,0), (1,0;0,0), and
(0,1;0,0). By [L2b], eGS1;1ð Þ
≠ 0;0ð Þ, thus (1,1 ;0,0) cannot be an SPE.
For e1=(1,0), the continuation game originally summarized in Fig. 4
simpliﬁes to Fig. 8.
In the continuation game GS1;0ð Þ, (0,0) is an NE if and only if (refer to
Fig. 8):
Player 20s best–response
 
β αvð Þ + 1−βð Þα2v ≥ β βv−cð Þ + 1−βð Þ αβv−cð Þ
i:e: c≥ β β−αð Þv + 1−βð Þα β−αð Þv
i:e: c≥ β + α 1−βð Þ½  β−αð Þv;
which contradicts condition (2). Thus, eGS1;0ð Þ
≠ 0;0ð Þ (by symmetry,
eGS0;1ð Þ
≠ 0;0ð ÞÞ, and the strategy proﬁles (1,0 ;0,0) and (0,1;0,0)
cannot be SPE.
By Corollary 1, eG sð1;0Þ =(1,1). To show that (1,0 ;1,1) cannot be an
SPE, recall the proof of Lemma 2. Note that if condition (10) holds,
then in the proof of Lemma 2, condition (A.2) is satisﬁed as a strict
inequality (because of (A.4)), and Eu21S (1,1 ;1,1)NEu21S (1,0;1,1); that
is, player 2's payoff from the ﬁrst-round strategy proﬁle (1,0)
(followed by (1,1) in the second round) is strictly less than his payoff
from the ﬁrst-round strategy proﬁle (1,1) (followed by (1,1) in Round
2). Therefore, given that player 1 is choosing e11=1, player 2 is
strictly better off deviating in Round 1 from e21=0 to e21=1, thus
(1,0;1,1) is not an SPE.
Since (1,0;1,1) is not an SPE, (0,1 ;1,1) is likewise not an SPE, by
symmetry.
By Lemma 3, (0,0;1,1) is not an SPE (because condition (10) implies
violation of (8)).
Finally, suppose that following the ﬁrst-round strategy proﬁle
(0,0), in the continuation game the strategy proﬁle (0,0) is played.
Then player 1's payoff is
EuS11 0;0; 0;0ð Þ = α2v + α 1−αð Þαv + 1−αð Þα2v + 1−αð Þ2α2v:
Player 1's payoff from the ﬁrst-round proﬁle (0,0) when it is followed
by (1,1) in the second round is
EuS11 0;0; 1;1ð Þ = α2v + α 1−αð Þβv + 1−αð Þα βv−cð Þ + 1−αð Þ2 β2v−c
 
:
By condition (2), β2v−cNα2v, and by condition (3), βv−cNαv
(recall Assumption 1, or equivalently condition (9), implies (2) and
(3)), so Eu11S (0,0;1,1)NEu11S (0,0;0,0). Condition (10) implies that
Eu11
S (1,0 ;1,1)NEu11S (0,0;1,1) (see the proof of Lemma 3). Therefore,
Eu11
S (1,0 ;1,1)NEu11S (0,0;0,0): given that player 2 chooses e21=0 in
the ﬁrst round, player 1 is strictly better off deviating to e11=1 in the
ﬁrst round, given that (1,1) is an equilibrium in the continuation game
under secrecy (under Assumption 1) by Corollary 1. Therefore,
(0,0;0,0) is not an SPE. This completes the argument that the
equilibrium, eGS1
= 1;1; 1;1ð Þ, is unique. □
Proof of Proposition 2. [P2a] If conditions (11) and (13) hold, then
condition (6) is satisﬁed and Lemma 1 applies.
[P2b] If c≤β(β−α)v (see condition (11)), then the right-hand side
inequality of (8) is satisﬁed, since β(β−α)vb(β−α)[β+α(1−β)]v. If
condition (12) holds, then the left-hand side inequality of (8) is also
satisﬁed, because of (A.4). So Lemma 3 applies.
[P2c] First note that condition (7)must bemet for eGS1
= 1;1; 1;1ð Þ to
arise. Consequently, if (12) holds, then eGS1
≠ 1;1; 1;1ð Þ. Next, by Remark 2
in Section 4, G S1;1ð Þ and G S1;0ð Þ do not have any asymmetric equilibrium.
Therefore, (1,1;1,0), (1,1;0,1), (1,0;1,0) and (1,0;0,1) cannot be SPE.
Finally, recall that Eu11S (1,0 ;1,1)≤Eu11S (0,0 ;1,1) if .and only if
c ≥ β−αð Þ β + α 1−βð Þ½  1−βð Þ1− β−αð Þ v (with the respective strict inequalities in the
two relations exactly corresponding); see the proof of Lemma 3. By (A.4),
condition (12) implies that c N β−αð Þ β + α 1−βð Þ½  1−βð Þ1− β−αð Þ v. Thus, Eu11
S
(1,0;1,1)bEu11S (0,0;1,1), and (1,0;1,1) cannot be an SPE.
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[P2d] We are going to show that conditions (11)–(13) would
rule outdisclosure equilibria that are inferior to the secrecy SPE (0,0;1,1).
Earlier in the text (before the formal statement of the proposition), we
have argued that if Assumption 1 holds, then the only strategy proﬁles
under disclosure that are either inferior or not directly comparable with
eGS1
= 0;0; 1;1ð Þ (and that can possibly arise in equilibrium) are
1;0; e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ, 0;1; e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ, and 0;0;e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ.
The strategy proﬁles 1;0; e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ and 0;1;e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ
cannot be MPE since these require (refer to Fig. 2):
y ≥ z; i:e:; c ≥ β−αð Þg α;βð Þv; ðA:5Þ
which is inconsistent with condition (13). On the other hand,
0;0;e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ is an MPE if and only if, in GD1 (refer to Fig. 2):
x ≥ w
i:e:; α2v + α 1−αð Þβv + 1−αð Þα βv−cð Þ + 1−αð Þ2α2v
≥ βαv + β 1−αð Þβv + 1−βð Þα βv−cð Þ + 1−βð Þ 1−αð Þα2v−c
i:e:; −α β−αð Þv− 1−αð Þ β−αð Þβv + α β−αð Þ βv−cð Þ + β−αð Þ 1−αð Þα2v + c≥0
i:e:; c≥
β−αð Þ 2β−α2
 
1−αð Þ− β−αð Þ
h i
1−α β−αð Þ v
i:e:; c≥ β−αð Þh α;βð Þv;
ðA:6Þ
where h α;βð Þ = 2β−α
2ð Þ 1−αð Þ− β−αð Þ
1−α β−αð Þ . However, if condition (13) holds,
then (A.6) will not be met. Therefore, 0;0; e˜12 að Þ;e˜22 að Þð Þ cannot be an
MPE. □
Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at
doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.01.009.
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